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Simon Says: Time for a New Approach to
Choice-of-Law Questions in Indiana
ERIC J. McKEowN"
INTRODUCTION
Since the Indiana Supreme Court abandoned its traditional choice-of-law approach
in the landmark case, Hubbard Manufacturing Co. v. Greeson,1 the court has
developed a replacement choice-of-law test that straddles the fence between traditional
and modem doctrine.2 Prior to Hubbard, Indiana adhered to the traditional rule of lex
loci delicti3 in resolving choice-of-law questions in tort disputes.4 In Hubbard, the
Indiana Supreme Court attempted to break away from the anomalous results that were
sometimes generated by rigid application of the traditional rule,5 but the court stopped
short of fully adopting the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts ("Restatement (Second)")
or the technique of governmental interest analysis, 6 which constitutes a vital
* J.D. Candidate, 2007, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.S., St.
Joseph's College. I would like to extend special thanks to Professor Gene Shreve for his insight
and commentary, and particularly for the excellent Conflicts of Law class that inspired my
interest in this topic. I would also like to thank Rob Dewitte, Derek Molter, Michael Ott, and
Michelle Gough for their help in the editing process. Finally, I would like to thank Suzy D. for
her loyal companionship and support.
1. 515 N.E.2d 1071 (Ind. 1987).
2. See generally David A. Moore, Note, Hubbard v. Greeson: Indiana's Misapplication of
the Tort Sections of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, 79 IND. L.J. 533 (2004)
(discussing inconsistencies in the application of the first prong of the Hubbard test by lower
courts and uncertainty over the extent to which either prong of the Hubbard test allows for use
of the Restatement (Second) methodology and governmental interest / policy analysis). Moore
describes the Hubbard test as one that "start[s] with a tremendously strong territorial
presumption that falls back on a grouping of contacts approach when the place of the tort is first
deemed insignificant." Id. at 550.
3. Lex loci delicti results in application of"[t]he law of the place where the tort or other
wrong was committed." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 930 (8th ed. 2004). The Restatement (First)
of Conflict of Laws ("Restatement (First)") defined the place of the wrong as "the state where
the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place." RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934). Practically, this almost always meant the law of the
place of the plaintiff's injury, because the injury would constitute the last event necessary to
subject the defendant to liability. WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS,
UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS 182 (3d ed. 2002).
4. See Hubbard, 515 N.E.2d at 1073.
5. See id.
6. Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1988, 37 AM. J.
COMP. L. 457, 458 (1989). Moore points out that, in crafting its choice-of-law approach, the
Indiana Supreme Court ignored Section 6 of the Restatement (Second), which includes, among
its list of central choice-of-law principles, consideration of the policy objectives of interested
states. Moore, supra note 2, at 550. Professor Symeonides agrees that the Hubbard"significant-
contacts approach ... calls for a consideration of the factual contacts alone, rather than of a set
of policies in light of the factual contacts as does the Restatement (Second)." Symeon C.
Symeonides, The Judicial Acceptance of the Second Conflicts Restatement: A Mixed Blessing,
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component of the Restatement (Second) and most other modem choice-of-law
approaches. While the Hubbard court favorably cited one section of the Restatement
(Second) and employed similar language in its decision, 7 the court ultimately
formulated a new choice-of-law test that has been characterized as a "significant-
contacts approach."8 Subsequent Indiana Supreme Court and lower court decisions left
open questions of the extent to which Indiana had adopted the Restatement (Second), if
at all, 9 and whether the Indiana approach incorporated governmental interest analysis
as a tool in resolving choice-of-law problems.' 0
In Simon v. United States," the Indiana Supreme Court seized the opportunity to
answer these questions, emphatically rejecting both the general analytical approach of
the Restatement (Second) and the technique of governmental interest analysis. 12 The
court also rejected the use of d~pegage, 13 declaring that under Indiana choice-of-law
doctrine, a single state's law should govern all substantive issues for a given claim.
14
The court ultimately viewed the gravamen of the case as an issue of conduct regulation,
and therefore concluded that the substantive law of Indiana-the location of the
defendant's negligent conduct-would govern all issues in the dispute.'"
56 MD. L. REv. 1248, 1272 n.159 (1997). Modem choice-of-law approaches that focus on or
incorporate governmental interest analysis include the Currie approach, comparative
impairment, the Restatement (Second), and Professor Robert Leflar's choice-influencing
considerations. See RiCHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 254-57.
7. The court cited section 145(2) of the Restatement (Second) for its list of state contacts
that should be evaluated in a tort choice-of-law dispute. Hubbard, 515 N.E.2d at 1073-74. The
court also held that "[t]hese factors should be evaluated according to their relative importance to
the particular issues being litigated," id. at 1074, a test with language similar to the directive
found in section 145 that "[t]hese contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative
importance with respect to the particular issue," RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFucT OF LAWS
§ 145 (1971).
8. See supra note 6 (discussing Professor Symeonides's characterization of the Indiana
approach).
9. See Allen v. Great Am. Reserve Ins. Co., 766 N.E.2d 1157 (Ind. 2002) (citing sections
145, 148, 174, and 291 of the Restatement (Second) in resolving choice-of-law questions);
Gollnick v. Gollnick, 517 N.E.2d 1257, 1259 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (citing section 169(2) of the
Restatement (Second) in support of the decision that the state law of the parties' domicile should
govern in matters of intra-family immunity), afl'd, 539 N.E.2d 3,4 (Ind. 1989) (stating that the
court of appeals had "merely applied California law.., in accordance with the choice of law
rule announced in [Hubbard].").
10. In Gollnick, the First District Court of Appeals arguably engaged in interest analysis in
its analysis of choice-of-law and intra-family immunity, concluding that California had a
"predominant interest" in regulating the family relationship of its citizens. See 517 N.E.2d at
1259; Moore, supra note 2, at 552 ("The court's discussion of [other] cases bordered on what
[could be described] as governmental interest analysis, constantly concerning itself with
California's interest in governing its family relationships." (emphasis in original)).
11. 805 N.E.2d 798 (Ind. 2004).
12. See id. at 803-04.
13. D~pegage is defined as "[a] court's application of different state laws to different issues
in a legal dispute; choice of law on an issue-by-issue basis." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 469-70
(8th ed. 2004).
14. Simon, 805 N.E.2d at 802-03.
15. Id. at806-07.
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This Note argues that in Simon, the Indiana Supreme Court missed an opportunity
to clarify Indiana choice-of-law doctrine; instead of providing clarity, the decision
raises puzzling questions for those using the Hubbard test to evaluate the relative
significance of state contacts to a dispute. Although the court emphatically rejected the
use of governmental interest analysis, this technique was central to the development of
the so-called "conduct-regulating exception" that the court relied upon to resolve
Simon. Indeed, the court's wholesale rejection ofgovernmental interest analysis led the
court to misapply this "conduct-regulating exception"' 6 to determine that Indiana
substantive law would govern all issues in the dispute.17 Further, absent acceptance of
governmental interest analysis, it is difficult to reconcile Simon with the court's choice-
of-law approach in the context of intra-family immunity provisions. Ultimately, the
Simon decision exposes the absence of a coherent analytical framework for
determining which state contacts are most significant under the Hubbard test.
Part I of this Note provides an overview of governmental interest analysis,
d6pegage, and the loss-allocating/conduct-regulating distinction in modem choice-of-
law doctrine. This Part begins by exploring traditional choice-of-law doctrine, and then
traces the transition to modem approaches that incorporate governmental interest
analysis and d6pegage. Part I concludes by examining the loss-allocating/conduct-
regulating distinction in modem choice-of-law approaches. Part II begins by discussing
the Hubbard decision, in which the Indiana Supreme Court first articulated its modem
choice-of-law test. Part II then discusses the Indiana Supreme Court's flirtation with
governmental interest analysis in the context of intra-family immunity. Part II
concludes by criticizing the Simon decision for rejecting some of the central tenets of
modem choice-of-law doctrine without offering a viable alternative analytical
framework.
I. GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST ANALYSIS, DtPE(AGE, AND THE Loss-
ALLOCATING/CONDUCT-REGULATING DISTINCTION IN TORT CASES
Governmental interest analysis, d6pegage, and the loss-allocating/conduct-
regulating distinction are interrelated concepts in modem choice-of-law doctrine; this
Part explores these three concepts. This section begins with a brief introduction to
traditional choice-of-law doctrine and the transition to modem approaches
incorporating governmental interest analysis.
A. From Lex Loci Delicti to Modern Doctrine: A Brief History
Under the traditional doctrine of lex loci delicti, a doctrine embraced by Indiana
until the Hubbard decision, courts encountering choice-of-law questions in tort
disputes mechanically applied the law of the "place of the wrong," which for practical
purposes meant the place where the plaintiff suffered her injury.18 This meant that a
plaintiff's ability to recover was governed by the law in place at the site of her injury,
16. Id. at 807 & n.12 (stating that "[c]ourts as a practical matter recognize a 'conduct-
regulating exception' to the normal interest-based choice-of-law methods" and applying that
rule to reach the application of the substantive law of Indiana, the site of the negligent conduct).
17. Id.
18. RIcHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 182.
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without regard for the laws that may have been in place in other states with connections
to the dispute.' 9 For instance, even where two parties were domiciled in the same state,
and where the parties' home state provided a right of recovery for the plaintiff, if the
state where the injury occurred did not provide such a right of recovery, then the
plaintiff had no cause of action.
20
The theoretical grounding for the traditional rule was embodied in two principles:
territoriality and vested rights.2 1 The principle of territoriality confined the operation of
a sovereign's law to its borders and prohibited giving laws extraterritorial effect.22
Under vested rights theory, legal rights were thought to "vest" in individuals according
to the law in place when a given event, such as an injury in a tort case, occurred.23
Vested rights theory accommodated the limitations of territoriality by allowing courts
of the forum state to avoid giving extraterritorial effect to another state's law; vested
rights theory required only that the forum recognize and enforce legal rights which had
"vested" elsewhere.24 As Justice Holmes explained: "The theory of the foreign suit is
that although the act complained of was subject to no law having force in the forum, it
gave rise to an obligation.., which, like other obligations, follows the person, and
may be enforced wherever the person may be found. 25
While the vested rights approach, enshrined in the Restatement (First),26 offered
"certainty, ease of application and predictability" of results, 27 courts and commentators
criticized it as a formalistic theory that often resulted in the application of the law of a
place that had only a fortuitous or attenuated connection to the events giving rise to the
dispute.28 Critics focused on the doctrine's failure to consider the policy objectives
behind the laws of other jurisdictions with connections to a given dispute.29 Failure to
consider these policy interests could lead to one of the principal vices of the
Restatement (First): the anomalous result of applying "the law of a state with no
interest in the resolution of the dispute. '30 Professor Symeon Symeonides describes the
flaws of the Restatement (First) as follows:
19. See id.
20. See, e.g., Ala. Great So. R.R. Co. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803 (Ala. 1892) (applying the law
of the state of the injury, Mississippi, to deny the plaintiff's claim against the defendant-
employer/railroad because Mississippi adhered to the common law fellow-servant rule, even
though the parties were both Alabama residents and Alabama had abrogated the common law
rule).
21. EUGENE F. SCOLES, PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS & SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 21 (4th ed. 2004).
22. See RICHMAN &'REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 178.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904).
26. RJCHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 180.
27. Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 281 (N.Y. 1963).
28. See id
29. Id. As the New York Court of Appeals pointed out, the traditional approach "ignores
the interest which jurisdictions other than that where the tort occurred may have in the
resolution of particular issues. It is for this very reason that... there has in recent years been
increasing criticism of the traditional rule by commentators and a judicial trend towards its
abandonment or modification." Id. (footnote omitted).
30. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 200.
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[T]hese rules were also rigid and mechanical. They completely sacrificed
flexibility in the altar of certainty and ignored the lessons of experience in the
pursuit of an ill-conceived theoretical purity. They chose not among laws, but
among states, based solely on a single, predesignated contact applied almost
automatically, regardless of its content, its underlying policy, or the substantive
quality of the solution it would bring to the case at hand.a'
Modem choice-of-law approaches, such as the "most significant relationship" test
employed by the New York Court of Appeals in the landmark case, Babcock v.
Jackson,32 sought to address the shortcomings of traditional doctrine by considering
the policy objectives behind competing laws. 33 In Babcock, three New York residents
took a weekend trip together to Ontario and were involved in a one-car auto accident
that seriously injured one of the passengers.34 Upon return to New York, the passenger
brought suit against the driver, alleging negligence in his operation of the car.35 At the
time of the accident, Ontario had a guest statute in place that would have prohibited the
suit, but New York had no such statute.36 Under traditional choice-of-law doctrine, the
place of the injury would govern the plaintiff's fight of recovery, and therefore,
application of Ontario's guest statute would preclude recovery.
37
The court posed the question: "Shall the law of the place of the tort invariably
govern the availability of relief for the tort or shall the applicable choice of law rule
also reflect a consideration of other factors which are relevant to the purposes served
by the enforcement or denial of the remedy? ' 38 The court answered this question by
deciding to apply the law of the place with the greatest interest in having its law
applied to the precise legal issue involved. 39 The court proceeded to identify the policy
interests behind each state's law, determining that Ontario sought to prevent fraudulent
claims against insurance carriers while New York sought to ensure compensation for
guests who were injured through the negligence of drivers. 4° The court concluded that
Ontario's policy interest was not implicated, because a New York insurer, not an
Ontario insurer, was involved in the case.4' Conversely, New York's interest in
31. Symeon C. Symeonides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution in the Courts: Today
and Tomorrow, in 298 RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 11,34 (2002).
32. 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963).
33. Id. at 283-84. "Justice, fairness and 'the best practical result' may best be achieved by
giving controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or
contact with the occurrence or the parties, has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised
in the litigation." Id. at 283 (internal citations omitted). The court eventually concluded that
because New York had a greater interest than Ontario, New York law should apply. Id. at 284.
34. Id. at 280.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 280-81.
38. Id. at 280-81 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
39. Id. at 283.
40. Id. at 284.
41. Id. ("Whether New York defendants are imposed upon or their insurers defrauded by a
New York plaintiff is scarcely a valid legislative concern of Ontario simply because the accident
occurred there, any more so than if the accident had happened in some other jurisdiction.").
2007]
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compensating guests was directly implicated by the New York citizenship of the
plaintiff, and New York had a predominant interest in regulating the guest-host
relationship where both parties were citizens of that state.42 Accordingly, New York
law applied with respect to this issue, rendering the Ontario guest statute
inapplicable.43
As demonstrated in Babcock, courts could avoid the anomalous results of traditional
doctrine by determining the significance of each state's contacts with a dispute through
consideration of the underlying policy objectives of each state's law and the particular
facts of the dispute. 44 The New York Court of Appeals elaborated on this process in
Dym v. Gordon,45 offering the following three-step methodology for approaching
choice-of-law questions: first, isolate the precise legal issue which results in a conflict
among the laws of competing jurisdictions;46 next, with regard to this issue, identify the
policy objectives that each law seeks to achieve; and finally, determine each
jurisdiction's interest by considering that jurisdiction's contacts with the dispute in
light of its policy objectives, ultimately deciding which state has a "superior
connection" with the dispute.
47
The approach described above is similar to the "governmental interest analysis"
methodology developed by the late, influential scholar Professor Brainerd Currie.4
Currie's methodology, like the Babcock/Dym approach, is based on the idea that laws
exist in order to further underlying policy objectives. On this view, mechanical choice-
of-law approaches are deficient because they select law without any consideration of
whether and how that application will further those underlying objectives.49
Currie's governmental interest analysis methodology departs somewhat from the
three-step process described above where a case involves a "true conflict"-a case in
which more than one jurisdiction is interested in the application of its law. Where such
a "true conflict" exists, Currie's approach results in the automatic application of forum
law, rather than a comparison of state interests to determine which state has the
superior interest. 50 However, the Currie approach is identical in the determination of
whether a given state is interested in the application of its law-a jurisdiction is
interested in the application of its law only if that law's underlying policy objectives
will be served by application of the law to the particular facts of the case.5'
42. Id. at 284-85. Because only New York was interested in the application of its law in
this case, it is a perfect illustration of a false conflict. False conflicts arise when only one
jurisdiction is truly interested in the application of its law to the legal issue presented. RicHMAN
& REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 240-42.
43. See Babcock, 191 N.E.2d at 285.
44. Id. at 281.
45. 209 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 1965).
46. This step requires a difference in the laws of the competing jurisdictions; if all states
with contacts to a given dispute have the same law with regard to a particular issue, then there is
no conflict with regard to that issue.
47. Dym, 209 N.E.2d at 794.
48. See RIcHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 239.
49. Id. at 239-40.
50. Id. at 247.
51. Currie describes a state interest as "'the product of(a) a governmental policy and (b) the
concurrent existence of an appropriate relationship between the state having the policy and the
[Vol. 82:523
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While the term "governmental interest analysis" is often associated specifically with
Currie's methodology, including his method of resolving true conflicts,5 2 this Note will
use the term "governmental interest analysis" more broadly. For purposes of this Note,
governmental interest analysis refers to a choice-of-law process that incorporates
consideration of the policy objectives behind competing laws and asks whether those
policy objectives are implicated by the facts of a given dispute.
Modem choice-of-law approaches, such as the Restatement (Second) and the Leflar
approach, incorporate some form of governmental interest analysis. 53 These
approaches differ from the Currie approach in their methods for resolving true conflicts
because they include consideration of additional factors, such as the justified
expectations of the parties to the dispute.5 4 In addition, these approaches may seek to
answer a question broader than that of which jurisdiction is most interested in the
application of its law. For example, the Restatement (Second) attempts to identify the
state with the "most significant relationship" to the dispute through application of its
central choice-of-law principles found in section 6.s These central principles include
governmental interest analysis, but the results of such analysis are not necessarily
dispositive 5 6 Nevertheless, governmental interest analysis plays a central role in almost
all modem choice-of-law approaches.
B. Issue-by-Issue Analysis and Dgpe~age
Traditional choice-of-law doctrine, as embodied in the Restatement (First), focused
on selecting the appropriate jurisdiction to supply the laws that would govern all the
substantive issues in a dispute, rather than engaging in issue-by-issue analysis.5 7 With
few exceptions, all substantive issues in a case were governed by the law of one state.58
transaction, the parties, or the litigation."' SCOLES ET AL., supra note 21, at 27 (quoting
BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 621 (1963)).
52. RJCHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 239, 244-45.
53. Section 6(2), which encapsulates the principles at the core of the Restatement (Second),
includes consideration of "the relevant policies of the forum," "the relevant policies of other
interested states," and "the basic policies underlying the particular field of law," and these
factors "reveal the central place of interest analysis in the Restatement's choice-of-law
methodology." RiCHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 206-07. Among Leflar's choice-
influencing considerations are "maintenance of interstate and international order," which
includes consideration of the policy interests of other interested states, and "advancement of the
forum's governmental interests," which considers the forum's interest in the dispute. Id. at 257-
58.
54. Section 6(2) of the Restatement (Second) includes consideration of the justified
expectations of the parties, along with other factors, such as "the needs of the interstate and
international systems." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(a), (d) (1971).
Similarly, Leflar's approach includes consideration of the justified expectations of the parties,
along with factors such as "predictability of result" and "the better rule of law." RiCHMAN &
REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 256-57.
55. "Section 6(2) and the concept of the most significant relationship form the heart of the
Restatement (Second)." RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 207.
56. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
57. RICHMAN&REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 171.
58. In contract disputes, the Restatement (First) sometimes resulted in dgpegage with
respect to substantive issues, since under section 332, validity issues were generally determined
2007]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
However, the forum would always apply its own procedural law, even where lex loci
principles dictated the application of some other state's law to the substantive issues of
the case. 59 This phenomenon of applying the law of different states to different issues
in a dispute is known as d~pecage.
60
Modem choice-of-law doctrine focuses on the selection of the appropriate
substantive law on an issue-by-issue basis, rather than selection of the appropriate
jurisdiction to govern all substantive issues in a dispute. 61 In Babcock, the landmark
conflicts case discussed above, the New York Court of Appeals directed the
application of "the law of the jurisdiction which.., has the greatest concern with the
specific issue raised in the litigation., 62 The court emphasized that there was "no
reason" why the laws of one jurisdiction should necessarily govern every discrete legal
issue in a tort claim.63 Similar language can be seen in section 145 of the Restatement
(Second), which establishes the general principle for tort disputes; this section directs
the evaluation of relevant contacts "according to their relative importance with respect
to the particular issue."
64
While Babcock involved a conflict with regard to only one substantive issue-the
applicability of the Ontario guest statute-65 -some cases involve conflicts concerning
more than one substantive issue, and such cases may result in ddpegage with regard to
substantive law. For example, in Sabell v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co.,66 the
court applied Iowa's law to determine whether the defendant's conduct was negligent
per se, but on the issue of the plaintiff's fault, the court applied Colorado's doctrine of
comparative negligence rather than the Iowa rule of contributory negligence.67 The
result-the application of the laws of two different states to two different substantive
issues in the dispute-constituted d6pegage, although the court did not explicitly use
this term to describe its approach.68
American courts routinely reach results that constitute ddpegage today, and most
academic commentary on the subject is favorable. 69 Ddpegage is consistent with
modem approaches that incorporate governmental interest analysis because it allows,
for each discrete substantive issue, application of the law of the jurisdiction that has the
by the law of the place of contracting while under section 358, performance issues were
determined by the law of the place of performance. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§§ 332, 358 (1934). See RiCHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 171.
59. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 171.
60. Id.
61. Symeonides, supra note 31, at 132.
62. Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 283 (N.Y. 1963) (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 285. The court went on to explain that issues of conduct regulation might be
governed by the law of the place of the negligent conduct, even though the law of the parties'
domicile governed the question of the applicability of the guest statute. Id. This foreshadows our
discussion of the loss-allocating/conduct-regulating distinction in tort law. See infra Part I.C.
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971) (emphasis added).
65. Babcock, 191 N.E.2d at 280.
66. 536 P.2d 1160 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975).
67. Id. at 1165-66.
68. Id. The court's failure to mention the term "d6pegage" is understandable, since
d6pegage refers not to a process, but to the result of applying more than one state's law to the
issues in a case. See Symeonides, supra note 31, at 132-33.
69. RIcHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 172; Symeonides, supra note 31, at 132.
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greatest interest in having its law applied.7 ° Professor Symeonides characterizes
d~peqage as:
the result, often unintended, of the abandonment of the traditional theory's broad
categories and the adoption of issue-by-issue analysis. It is also a natural
consequence, and an appropriate recognition, of the fact that the states involved in
the case may be interested in different aspects of it or interested in varying
degrees. As such, d~peqage is, per se, neither good nor bad.71
Viewed from this perspective-as a natural byproduct of modem approaches to choice-
of-law-it is unsurprising that d6pegage has encountered little scholarly resistance.
However, commentators have identified one situation in which d~peqage should be
avoided-where combining the laws of two states would produce a result that frustrates
the policy objectives of both states without advancing either state's interest.72 For
example, in a New Jersey case73 involving a court applying the traditional "vested
rights" approach, the laws of New Jersey and New York were combined to hold an
insurer liable even though the insurer would not have faced liability in either state in a
purely domestic case.74 This result frustrated the policy objectives of both states, and
accordingly, commentators harshly criticized the result." The case illustrates the
danger of issue-by-issue selection of law where one state's law reflects a compromise
among policies and is combined with another state's law in a manner such that the two
laws form an inseparable whole.76 Selection of only one of those laws may frustrate the
state's policy objectives. 7
A proper application of modern doctrine that includes governmental interest
analysis would seem to preclude this result. Governmental interest analysis involves a
determination of the policy objectives behind each law and only directs the application
of a state's law where that state is "interested"--where the state's underlying policy
objectives would be furthered by application of its law to a particular situation. Even
where issue-by-issue analysis is employed, where a law's policy objective can be
70. See Christopher G. Stevenson, Note, Depecage: Embracing Complexity to Solve
Choice-of-Law Issues, 37 IND. L. REv. 303,328 (2003).
71. Symeonides, supra note 31, at 132-33 (italics omitted).
72. Id. at 133; RICHMAN&REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 171-72.
73. Md. Cas. Co. v. Jacek, 156 F. Supp. 43 (D.N.J. 1957).
74. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 3, at 171-72 (discussing and criticizing the Jacek
case).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Professor Symeonides describes the situation as one where "the rule of one state that is
chosen is so closely interrelated to a rule of the same state that is not chosen that applying the
one rule without the other would drastically upset the equilibrium established by the two rules
and would distort and defeat the policies of that state." Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law
in the American Courts in 2004: Eighteenth Annual Survey, 52 AM. J. COMp. L. 919,947-48
(2004) (quoting SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, WENDY C. PERDUE & ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN,
CONFLICT OF LAWS: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE, INTERNATIONAL 260 (2d ed. 2003)). Professor
Symeonides suggests that courts can devise better solutions to this problem than outright
rejection ofddperage. Id.
78. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
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understood only with reference to some other complementary law, consideration of that
complementary law is necessary to determine a state's interest in the application of its
law. 79 A state would never be "interested" in having its law applied in a manner that
would compromise its ultimate policy goals.80
The discussion above demonstrates that dipegage is a fairly unremarkable
byproduct of the issue-by-issue focus of modem choice-of-law doctrine, rather than a
process unto itself, and that ddpegage-at least when it involved the application of
forum procedural law and some other state's substantive law-was considered an
acceptable result even under traditional choice-of-law doctrine.8' The next section
explores the connections between governmental interest analysis, d~pegage, and the
loss-allocating/conduct-regulating distinction in modem choice-of-law doctrine.
C. The Loss-Allocating/Conduct-Regulating Distinction in Torts
Governmental interest analysis and the modem focus on resolving choice-of-law
questions on an issue-by-issue basis help to explain one of the fundamental concepts in
modem choice-of-law doctrine in tort disputes: the distinction between laws directed to
loss allocation and laws directed to the regulation of conduct.8 2 Governmental interest
analysis suggests that for the former category of laws, the domicile of the parties
should usually determine choice-of-law questions, whereas for the latter category, the
location of the parties' conduct is more important.8 3 Two aspects of modem doctrine-
issue-by-issue analysis and the permissibility of ddpegage-give rise to the possibility
that for a given tort dispute, the laws of different states may govern issues of conduct
regulation and loss allocation."
Babcock embraced this conceptual distinction and the notion that, in a single case,
the law of one state might govern issues of conduct regulation, while the law of another
state could govern issues of loss allocation. 5 In Babcock, the court emphasized that the
conflict was confined to a single, narrow issue-Ontario's guest statute and New
York's absence thereof-and that with respect to this issue, the state of the parties'
domicile, New York, enjoyed the dominant interest.8 6 However, in dicta, the court
noted that if the conflict between the two jurisdictions' laws had related to an issue of
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text. Under modem doctrine, substantive
ddpe~age, that is, d6pegage with regard to the substantive issues in the case, will be more
common than under the traditional approach due to the focus of the traditional approach on
issue-by-issue resolution of substantive issues.
82. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 21, at 790-93 (discussing the evolution of the
distinction).
83. Id. Professor Symeonides points out that most major cases in the "American conflicts
revolution," including Babcock, involved loss-distribution conflicts, because "it is with regard
to these conflicts that the territorially based traditional system proved most deficient."
Symeonides, supra note 31, at 173.
84. See infra text accompanying notes 93-101.
85. See ScoLEs ET AL., supra note 21, at 790-91 (discussing Babcock and the origins of the
loss-allocating/conduct-regulating distinction).
86. Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284-85 (N.Y. 1963).
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conduct regulation, then the jurisdiction where the negligent conduct occurred,
Ontario, would have enjoyed the superior interest.87 The court explained its rationale:
It is hardly necessary to say that Ontario's interest is quite different from what
it would have been had the issue related to the manner in which the defendant had
been driving his car at the time of the accident. Where the defendant's exercise of
due care in the operation of his automobile is in issue, the jurisdiction in which the
allegedly wrongful conduct occurred will usually have a predominant, if not
exclusive, concern. In such a case, it is appropriate to look to the law of the place
of the tort so as to give effect to that jurisdiction's interest in regulating conduct
within its borders, and it would be almost unthinkable to seek the applicable rule
in the law of some other place. 88
The court acknowledged the possibility of ddpeqage, noting that if such a conflict
regarding the standard of care had arisen in this case, nothing would have prevented
the court from applying Ontario law to issues of conduct regulation and New York law
to issues of loss allocation(such as the applicability of the guest statute).8 9
The court elaborated on this distinction in Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America,90
explaining that where a conflict in laws concerns appropriate standards of conduct,
such as "rules of the road," the application of the law of the jurisdiction where the
conduct occurred is supported by the jurisdiction's interest in the "admonitory effect"
of such application on future conduct within its borders as well as protection of the
justifiable expectations of the parties.9 1 Conversely, where the conflicting laws pertain
primarily to the loss allocation, such as limitations on damages or immunities from suit,
then the state of common domicile of the parties has the superior interest in the
application of its law "because of its interest in enforcing the decisions of both parties
to accept both the benefits and the burdens of identifying with that jurisdiction., 92
Sabell v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co.93 provides an example of a court using
this distinction in order to reach a decision applying the substantive laws of different
states to different issues in a dispute.94 In Sabell, the plaintiff, a Colorado resident,
sued the defendant, a Colorado corporation, for damages arising from an auto accident
between the two parties in Iowa. 95 The court identified two choice-of-law issues to be
resolved: (1) whether to apply Iowa or Colorado law to determine whether the parties
had behaved negligently; and (2) whether to apply the contributory negligence rule of
Iowa, which would absolutely bar recovery if the plaintiff were found negligent, or the
comparative negligence rule of Colorado, which would only reduce the possible
reward.96
87. Id. at 284.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 284-85.
90. 480 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1985).
91. Id. at684-85.
92. Id. at 685.
93. 536 P.2d 1160 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1162.
96. Id. at 1163.
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Applying the Restatement (Second), the court concluded that, among the choice-of-
law principles found in section 6, the governmental interest analysis factors were most
important to resolution of this case, and proceeded to analyze the interests of each
jurisdiction.97 The court concluded that Iowa law should govern the issue of the
parties' negligence, because "the state in which the motor vehicle collision and the
conduct which caused such collision occurs has an overriding interest in regulating the
minimum standards of acceptable conduct by motorists using its roads." 98 Conversely,
the court concluded that Colorado's comparative negligence law should govern the
plaintiff's ability to recover, because "[t]he relationship the parties have with a
particular state has the greatest effect upon which of such rules of recovery should
apply." 99 The court directed that in future cases, choice-of-law questions related to
comparative negligence rules should focus on the parties' state of domicile/residence,
or the state where the relationship between the parties is centered.100 This decision
illustrates how the loss-allocating/conduct-regulating distinction may lead to d6pegage
in a case involving conflicts of laws related to both loss allocation and conduct
regulation.
As illustrated above, the loss-allocating/conduct-regulating distinction is grounded
in modem choice-of-law doctrine incorporating governmental interest analysis.°1 With
regard to loss-allocating rules, modem doctrine focuses on the domicile of the parties
as the most significant contact, based on the assumption that a state's loss-allocation
policy always extends to its domiciliaries, even when they act outside the state.'0 2 With
regard to conduct-regulating rules, modem doctrine focuses on the location of the
conduct, based on the assumption that a state's conduct-regulating rules operate
territorially, because "[a] state's policy of deterrence embodied in its conduct-
regulating rules is implicated by all sub-standard conduct that occurs within its
territory," regardless of the parties' domiciles.'° 3
Although this distinction is part of modem doctrine, even traditional choice-of-law
doctrine sometimes dictated application of the law of the place of the allegedly tortious
conduct to issues of conduct regulation."14 Section 3 80(2) of the Restatement (First)
specifies that "where by the law of the place of wrong, the liability-creating character
of the actor's conduct depends upon the application of a standard of care, and such
standard has been defined in particular situations by. . . the law of the place of the
actor's conduct, such application of the standard will be made by the forum."' °5 Under
this provision, where the law of the place of the allegedly tortious conduct specifies, by
statute or common law rule, a standard of care for a particular situation, that standard
should be applied to determine whether a defendant's conduct may result in liability.1
0 6
97. Id. at 1164.
98. Id. at 1164-65.
99. Id. at 1165.
100. Id. at 1166.
101. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 21, at 790-93.
102. Id. at 791-92.
103. Id. at 793.
104. John T. Cross, The Conduct-Regulating Exception in Modern United States Choice-of-
Law, 36 CREIGHTON L. REv. 425,428-30 (2003).
105. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 380(2) (1934).
106. Cross, supra note 104, at 428.
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Although the classical approach requires application of the law of the state of the injury
to the remaining elements of the tort claim, even the classical approach selects the
appropriate standard of care according to the place where the allegedly tortious
conduct occurred.1
0 7
In jurisdictions that have abandoned the classical approach in favor of a modem
approach incorporating some form of governmental interest analysis (which
characterizes most American jurisdictions today),10 8 application of the law of the place
of the allegedly tortious conduct to issues of conduct regulation is virtually
universal.'19 As under the approach of the Restatement (First), and as explained by the
Babcock court and illustrated in Sabell, this does not necessarily result in the
application of the law of the conduct-regulating state to all issues in the dispute; rather,
other issues, such as loss allocation issues, may be governed by the laws of other states,
resulting in ddpegage."
0
One commentator, Professor John T. Cross, argues that courts employing modem
choice-of-law approaches have adopted this principle-application of the law of the
place of the allegedly tortious conduct to issues of conduct regulation-as an absolute
rule, which he describes as the "conduct-regulating exception.""' Cross argues that
under modem approaches, full consideration of the governmental interests of other
jurisdictions, among other factors, should sometimes lead to the application of the law
of another jurisdiction, even on issues of conduct regulation."12 Therefore, he
characterizes this absolute preference for the law of the place where the conduct
occurred with regard to issues of conduct-regulation as the "conduct-regulating
exception" in modem choice-of-law methods."13
However, the modern loss-allocating/conduct-regulating distinction is based on
governmental interest analysis, as explained above."14 Therefore, characterizing this
near-absolute preference for the law of the place of the tortious conduct with respect to
issues of conduct regulation as an "exception" to modem doctrine seems to go too far.
Courts using modern approaches apply this rule because it seems consistent with
governmental interest analysis and the justifiable expectations of the parties," 15 and
107. Id. at 428-29.
108. Only 10 states continue to adhere to lex loci delicti, and the remainder follow one of the
modem approaches, with a majority of these following the Restatement. Symeonides, supra note
77, at 942-43.
109. Cross, supra note 104, at 436-42.
110. Id. at 439; Sabell v. Pac. Intermountain Express Co., 536 P.2d 1160, 1164-66 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1975); Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284-85 (N.Y. 1963).
111. Cross, supra note 104, at 437.
112. In fact, Cross argues that there are only three cases in which the rule of the conduct state
("CS") should automatically be selected over the law of another jurisdiction ("OS"):
(a) when the law of CS is stricter than that of OS; (b) when the laws of CS and OS
create incompatible standards of conduct, or (c) when the standard of CS is more
lenient and the actor can demonstrate that she actually knew that standard and
justifiably relied on it when engaging in the actions that gave rise to the tort.
Id. at 457. Cross argues that the law of CS may be applied in other situations as well, but these
are the only situations in which it should be automatically applied. Id. at 458.
113. Id. at436-42.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 82-84.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 90-91.
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therefore consistent with modem doctrine. Even if exhaustive analysis under principles
of modem doctrine indicates that this rule should not be applied invariably," 16 the rule
itself is still derived from a modem approach incorporating governmental interest
analysis.
The foregoing discussion shows that governmental interest analysis, d6pegage, and
the loss-allocating/conduct-regulating distinction are interrelated concepts; proper
understanding and application of the last of these concepts is not possible without
proper understanding of the first two. This Note now turns to the Indiana choice-of-law
doctrine, the Simon decision, and Indiana's curious reliance on the so-called "conduct-
regulating exception" in light of its simultaneous rejection of both governmental
interest analysis and d~pegage.
II. INDIANA CHOICE-OF-LAW DOCTRINE IN LIGHT OF SIMON
Indiana's abandonment of the traditional rule of lex loci delicti in favor of the
Hubbard test was followed by a period of confusion regarding the precise contours of
Indiana choice-of-law doctrine."17 Simon presented an opportunity for the Indiana
Supreme Court to clarify its choice-of-law doctrine, and while the court did answer
some outstanding questions, it introduced further confusion through its misapplication
of the so-called "conduct-regulating exception" and its simultaneous rejection of both
governmental interest analysis and ddpegage. This Part will first discuss the Hubbard
test and the questions that emerged prior to Simon, and then analyze Simon's
implications.
A. The Hubbard Test
In the landmark 1987 case, Hubbard Manufacturing Co. v. Greeson, 8 the Indiana
Supreme Court abandoned the traditional doctrine of lex loci delicti and adopted what
has since become known as the Hubbard test, a two-part test for resolving choice-of-
law questions in tort disputes.' 19 Hubbard involved an Indiana plaintiff pursuing a
wrongful death action against an Indiana corporation that manufactured lift units for
street light maintenance. 20 The plaintiff alleged that her husband's death was caused
by the defective manufacture of the defendant's lift unit. 2' The accident that led to her
husband's death occurred in Illinois while the decedent conducted street light
maintenance using one of the lift units. 22 Indiana law would have barred recovery if
the product represented an open and obvious danger or if product misuse occurred,
whereas Illinois law would not have absolutely barred recovery in either
circumstance. 1
23
116. See Cross, supra note 104, at 436-42.
117. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
118. 515 N.E.2d 1071 (Ind. 1987).
119. Id. at 1074.
120. Id. at 1072.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1073.
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Since Indiana followed lex loci delicti at the time of the Hubbard case, application
of existing Indiana choice-of-law rules would have resulted in the application of the
law of the place of the injury, Illinois. 24 The court saw this as an anomalous result,
since all the jurisdictions bordering Indiana would have applied Indiana law to the
dispute.125 In order to avoid this "inappropriate result," the court sought to craft a
choice-of-law test that would "ensure the appropriate substantive law applies.'
' 26
The court proceeded to announce its new two-part test for analyzing choice-of-law
problems in torts.12 7 First, the court noted that the place of the tort will often be
"significant and the place with the most contacts," and therefore, the traditional rule
would be appropriate in many cases.128 Accordingly, under the first prong of the
court's test, the law of the place of the tort would apply unless it "bears little
connection to the legal action" or is an "insignificant contact."' 29 The court determined
that none of the contacts with Illinois related to the wrongful death suit, and therefore
declared the place of the tort insignificant.'
30
Since the court determined that the place of the tort was an insignificant contact in
this case, it proceeded to the second prong of the test, a determination of whether
another place has a "more significant relationship and contacts."' 3' In making this
determination, the court cited section 145 of the Restatement (Second) for a list of
contacts that courts should consider: "1) the place where the conduct causing the injury
occurred; 2) the residence or place of business of the parties; and 3) the place where
the relationship is centered.' 32 The court also directed that these contacts "should be
evaluated according to their relative importance to the particular issues being
litigated,"'133 employing language similar to that found in Babcock and the Restatement
(Second).34 Evaluating the contacts listed above, the court determined that Indiana had
the more significant relationship to the dispute; both parties were Indiana residents, the
relationship between them was centered in Indiana, and the decedent frequently visited
the defendant's plant in order to discuss repair and maintenance of the lift unit.
13
Although the court abandoned the traditional choice-of-law rule for torts in
Hubbard and crafted a replacement test, significant questions remained unanswered.
The court offered little guidance on how to determine whether the place of the tort was
a significant contact under the first prong of the test. 36 In addition, while the court
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1073-74.
128. Id. at 1073.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1074.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1073-74 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAws § 145(2) (1971)).
133. Id. at 1074.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 32, 55.
135. Hubbard, 515 N.E.2d at 1074.
136. The court simply listed the contacts with Illinois and then stated, in conclusory fashion,
that these contacts did not "relate" to the wrongful death action and that the place of the tort was
therefore insignificant. Id. However, the court offered no insight into how it determined that the
contacts did not relate to the legal action. Id.
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cited section 145(2) of the Restatement (Second) for a list of relevant contacts to
evaluate in the second prong of the test, the court declined to elaborate on when and
how courts could turn to the Restatement (Second) for general guidance. 137 Perhaps the
most puzzling feature of the Hubbard opinion was the court's abandonment of its
traditional approach without any mention of governmental interest analysis; the court
simply failed to discuss this methodology. 138 Modem choice-of-law approaches
generally incorporate governmental interest analysis as a central tool in evaluating the
significance of state contacts, seeking to avoid the "anomalous" outcomes that
sometimes resulted under lex loci delicti.' 39 While the Indiana Supreme Court also
sought to avoid such anomalous results, directing evaluation of state contacts according
to their relative importance to the issues being litigated, the court failed to specify how
this relative importance was to be determined.
40
B. Gollnick: Embracing Governmental Interest Analysis?
One post-Hubbard decision strongly suggested that the Indiana Supreme Court
might be amenable to incorporating governmental interest analysis, and perhaps other
principles of the Restatement (Second), in its choice-of-law methodology. In Gollnick
v. Gollnick,14 1 the court affirmed and adopted as its own a decision by the court of
appeals that applied California law to govern an issue of intrafamily immunity in a tort
dispute where both parties were California residents and the accident occurred in
Indiana.' 42 The court indicated that the appellate court had correctly applied the
Hubbard test to reach the proper result, but said little else about the lower court's
decision.
143
Gollnick was an intrafamily dispute between divorced California residents that arose
from a sledding accident in Indiana.144 The father-defendant, in exercise of his
visitation rights, had taken his daughters to Indiana to visit their aunt and uncle.
145
While in Indiana, one of the daughters was struck by a car and injured while sledding
without adult supervision. 146 The choice-of-law issue presented was whether the
intrafamily immunity rules of Indiana or California would govern the dispute.
147
Applying Hubbard, the First District Court of Appeals decided that Indiana, the
place of the tort, bore "little connection to the legal action."' 48 The court cited
numerous cases from other jurisdictions for the proposition that in matters of
137. Id. at 1073-74.
138. Id. See Moore, supra note 2, at 550.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
140. Hubbard, 515 N.E.2d at 1073-74.
141. 539 N.E.2d 3 (Ind. 1989) (per curiam).
142. Id. at 4.
143. Id.
144. Gollnick v. Gollnick, 514 N.E.2d 645, 647 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987), reh'g granted, 517
N.E.2d 1257 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (decided prior to the Hubbard decision).
145. Id. at 647.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 648.
148. Gollnick, 517 N.E.2d at 1259 (decided after the Hubbard decision with the court of
appeals reconsidering its prior decision in light of Hubbard).
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intrafamily immunity, the state of the parties' domicile has a superior interest in
regulating the family relationship. 149 The court also cited the Restatement (Second) for
the proposition that in matters of intrafamily immunity, the parties' common domicile
will usually provide the applicable law.' 50 The court concluded that California enjoyed
a "predominant interest" in the regulation of the family relationship of its citizens, and
that this interest would override the occurrence of the accident in Indiana.' 5 ' Therefore,
the court applied California's intrafamily immunity rule.'
5 2
A plausible reading of the Indiana Supreme Court's approval of Gollnick might
elicit the conclusion that the court embraced a choice-of-law approach incorporating
both governmental interest analysis and the loss-allocating/conduct-regulating
distinction. Intrafamily immunity, and more generally capacity to sue, is considered a
rule dealing with loss allocation; 53 therefore, applying the law of the parties' common
domicile as the state with the "predominant interest" with respect to this issue would be
consistent with governmental interest analysis. Such incorporation of governmental
interest analysis into the Hubbard test would have provided guidance to courts in
executing the test's directive to evaluate contacts according to their relative importance
to the issues being litigated.
In Simon, the court would have the opportunity to clarify its position regarding
governmental interest analysis and the broader choice-of-law principles embodied in
the Restatement (Second). Unfortunately, as discussed in the next section, the court's
decision in Simon failed to provide clarity; rather, it exposed the Hubbard test's lack of
a coherent analytical framework for determining the relative significance of state
contacts.
C. The Simon Opinion: A Rejection of Governmental Interest Analysis, the
Restatement (Second), and Dpeqage
In Simon v. United States,14 the Indiana Supreme Court responded to certified
questions from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concerning the
appropriate application of Indiana choice-of-law doctrine to a wrongful death action
against the United States government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) . 51
Under the FTCA, a court applies the entire law, including choice-of-law rules, of the
place where the negligent conduct occurred. 156 In Simon, the allegedly negligent
conduct occurred in both the District of Columbia (D.C.) and Indiana; if there was a
"true conflict" between the choice-of-law rules of these jurisdictions, then the Third
Circuit would apply the choice-of-law rules of the place where the last significant
149. See id. at 1258-59 (citing Wartell v. Formusca, 213 N.E.2d 544 (Ill. 1966) and Emery
v. Emery, 289 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1955), among other cases).
150. See id. at 1259 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAwS § 169(2) (197 1)).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 21, at 794 (describing both guest statutes and intrafamily
immunity rules as "clearly loss-distributing").
154. 805 N.E.2d 798 (Ind. 2004).
155. Id. at 800.
156. Id. at 801.
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negligent act occurred, which was Indiana.' 57 Therefore, the Third Circuit certified
questions to the Indiana Supreme Court in order to determine (1)whether a true conflict
existed between Indiana and D.C. choice-of-law rules, and (2) in the event of such a
conflict, to determine how Indiana choice-of-law rules would resolve the conflicts
issues. 158
Simon arose from the crash of a small private aircraft in Kentucky, killing two
Pennsylvania passengers, a Georgia passenger, and the pilot, who lived in New Jersey
but worked in Pennsylvania.' 59 The flight began in Pennsylvania, stopped overnight in
Ohio, and ended with the fatal crash in Kentucky without ever passing through
Indiana. 60 Due to poor weather conditions, the pilot, relying on a chart published by
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in D.C., sought clearance for a Simplified
Directional Facility (SDF) approach at the Somerset, Kentucky airport. 161 Even though
the proper instrumentation required for this type of landing had not been operational at
the Somerset airport for several years, Indiana-based FAA air traffic controllers cleared
the approach.162 After the resulting crash, the plaintiffs brought wrongful death
complaints under the FTCA in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, alleging negligence by the government in: first, publication of the
erroneous chart information in D.C.; and second, the Indiana-based air traffic
controllers' clearance of the approach, failure to properly monitor the approach via
radar, failure to alert the pilot of an impending obstacle, and failure to respond to last-
minute radio communications. 163 By the time the Third Circuit's certified questions
reached the Indiana Supreme Court, two cases had settled, and the remaining plaintiffs
were suing on behalf of the estates of one of the Pennsylvania passengers and the
pilot. 164
The Indiana Supreme Court answered the Third Circuit's first question by declaring
that a "true conflict" existed between the choice-of-law rules of Indiana and D.C.1
65
The court explained that D.C.'s choice-of-law methodology, unlike Indiana's,
embraces both d6pegage and a hybrid Restatement (Second) / governmental interest
analysis, resulting in a "true conflict" in choice-of-law methods. 66 The court then
proceeded to the second certified question, determining that under Indiana choice-of-
law rules, Indiana law would govern all issues in the dispute. 167 The court's reasoning
for each of these conclusions is explained below.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 801.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 800-01.
163. Id. at 801.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 801-03.
167. Id at 804.
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1. Rejecting Ddpegage
The court began by rejecting d~pegage, which it characterized as "the process of
analyzing different issues within the same case separately under the laws of different
states."'' 68 The court offered four primary reasons for rejecting d~pegage.
First, the court acknowledged that Hubbard directed courts to analyze state contacts
according to their relative importance to the particular issues being litigated.
69
However, the court emphasized that despite similar language in the Restatement
(Second), and despite the court's favorable citation to the Restatement (Second) in
Hubbard, Indiana had adopted neither the Restatement (Second) nor its issue-by-issue
approach to choice-of-law questions regarding substantive law. 170 Second, the court
characterized Indiana as "still primarily a lex loci state" and stated that d~pegage is not
allowed under the lex loci approach.17' The court said that it would, therefore, be
"illogical" to incorporate d~pegage into the Hubbard approach. 72 Third, the court
pointed out that some laws are enacted with the purpose and expectation that they will
interact with other, complementary laws.173 Applying such laws in isolation, the court
said, "may hinder the policy of one or more states without furthering the considered
policy of any state."' 174 Fourth, the court argued that d~pegage might generate unfair
results by producing a hybrid law more favorable to one party than another, which
would not exist if the law of just one state were applied. 75 Further, drpegage could
compound the advantage of a party with greater access to legal resources by requiring
separate analysis of each issue for each state with connections to the dispute.
76
2. Rejecting Governmental Interest Analysis
Next, the court turned its focus to governmental interest analysis, emphatically
rejecting any place for such analysis in the Hubbard test. 177 The court noted that D.C.
employs a hybrid governmental interest analysis / Restatement (Second) methodology
that identifies the policy interests behind applicable laws and attempts to apply the law
of the most interested jurisdiction. 78 The court stated that "Indiana does not require
that courts undertake the difficult and ultimately speculative task of identifying the
policies underlying the laws of multiple states and weighing the potential advancement
of each in the context of the case."' 79 Rather, under the Hubbard approach, a court
should "simply look at the contacts that exist between the action and the relevant states
168. Id. at 801.
169. Id. at 802.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 802-03.
174. Id. at803.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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and determine which state has the most significant relationship with the action."' 8 ° The
court stated that it need not decide whether this difference in methodology would
produce a "true conflict" in choice-of-law methods between Indiana and D.C., because
the differences with respect to drpegage were sufficient to conclude that such a conflict
existed. 181
D. Applying the Hubbard Test to Select Indiana Substantive Law
After determining that a conflict existed between the Indiana and D.C. choice-of-
law tests, the court answered the second certified question, applying the Hubbard test
to select Indiana substantive law to govern all issues in the dispute.'8 2 The court began
by explaining its rejection of the Restatement (Second), criticizing it as "a hodgepodge
of all theories" that resulted in unpredictable outcomes, allowed manipulative courts to
reach any decision they desired, and offered even the most well-intentioned courts "no
guidance" in resolving choice-of-law questions. 183
Applying the Hubbard test, the court noted that it must first identify whether, for the
relevant jurisdictions, differences in substantive law existed that would be "important
enough to affect the outcome of the litigation."' 84 The plaintiffs had urged the
application of Pennsylvania law to the dispute, whereas the defendants had urged the
application of Indiana law.185 The court identified three significant differences in the
states' respective laws: (1) Pennsylvania law allowed for joint-and-several liability and
right of contribution, while Indiana did not; (2) Pennsylvania allowed for recovery for
both wrongful death and survival damages, while Indiana did not; and (3) Pennsylvania
damages included the decedent's conscious pain and suffering from the moment of
injury until the time of death, while Indiana damages did not.' 86
Proceeding with the Hubbard analysis, the court next asked whether the place of the
injury was an insignificant contact bearing "little connection to the legal action," and
concluded that Kentucky was, indeed, an insignificant contact.' 87 Noting that the
location of the negligent conduct and the domicile of the parties pointed elsewhere, and
that the ultimate location of the crash was largely fortuitous, the court characterized
this as one of the "rare cases" where application of the traditional lex loci delicti rule
would be inappropriate.
188
Turning to the second prong of the Hubbard test, the court stated that it would apply
the law of the state with "the most significant relationship to the case.', 8 9 The court
reiterated the three contacts that it had listed in Hubbard for resolving choice-of-law
questions in tort disputes: (1) the place of the tortious conduct; (2) the parties'
180. Id.
181. Id. at 803-04.
182. Id. at 804.
183. See id. at 804 (quoting Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case
for Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO L.J. 1, 8 (1991)).
184. Id. at 805.
185. Seeid.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 806.
188. See id.
189. Id.
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residence or place of business; and (3) the place where the parties' relationship is
centered.1 90 The court then explained that this is not a comprehensive list and that other
relevant factors may be considered, although none were present in this case. 191 The
court also stated that "[t]hese factors should not be applied mechanically," but should
be "evaluated according to their relative importance to the particular issues before the
court."'
192
The court concluded that the gravamen of this case was the allegedly negligent
conduct, and that therefore, the law of the place of that conduct should apply. 93 The
court explained that "the most important relevant factor is where the conduct causing
the injury occurred because an individual's actions and the recovery available to others
as a result of those actions should be governed by the law of the state in which he
acts."' 94 In a footnote, the court characterized this as a "nearly universal" principle and
went on to seek support for this principle in the "conduct-regulating exception"
discussed earlier in this Note. 95 The court explained:
Even under the modem methods there are certain issues for which courts
continue to apply the law of the place where the tort occurred. The most notable of
these issues are those concerning a party's conduct. If the state of conduct has a
law regulating how the tortfeasor or victim is supposed to act in the particular
situation, courts will apply that standard rather than the law of the parties'
residence. In fact, this preference for the conduct-regulating law of the conduct
state is virtually absolute, winning out even over the law of other interested states.
Courts as a practical matter recognize a "conduct-regulating exception" to the
normal interest-based choice-of-law methods. 96
The court dismissed the residence of the parties or the place where the parties'
relationship was centered as important factors in this case. 197 The court appeared to
give a nod to Gollnick, stating that while the parties' residence or place of business is
important in cases of "family law or asset distribution," it was not particularly
important in this case. 98 According to the court, "[p]eople do not take the laws of their
home state with them when they travel but are subject to the laws of the state in which
they act."' 199 Further, the court stressed that the negligent conduct of the FAA and the
air traffic controllers was at issue in the case, and emphasized that the conduct of the
plaintiffs was not in issue.200 Finally, the court concluded that the contact between the
allegedly negligent party and the injured party was "fleeting"-thus, there was no "real
relationship" between the parties and therefore the relationship could not be centered
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 806-07.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 807 n. 12.
196. Id.
197. See id. at 807.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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anywhere.20 1 As a result, the court concluded that under Indiana choice-of-law
doctrine, Indiana substantive law would apply.
20 2
E. Simon: A Critique
While the Simon decision offered some clarity in rejecting d~pegage, governmental
interest analysis, and the Restatement (Second), the court's opinion left much to be
desired. First, the reasons the court offered for rejecting d6pegage were largely
unpersuasive. Second, the court misapplied the so-called conduct-regulating exception
to reach its decision that Indiana substantive law would apply to all issues in the
dispute. Finally, the Simon opinion adds little clarity, and arguably introduces greater
confusion, regarding the methodology that Indiana courts should use to determine the
relative importance of state contacts when resolving choice-of-law questions in tort
disputes.
1. An Unpersuasive Rejection of D6pegage
The Simon court's reasons for rejecting ddpeqage are not persuasive. First, contrary
to the court's assertion, d6pegage is a result-the application of different states' laws to
different issues in a case-rather than a process, 20 3 and ddpegage occurred even under
the traditional lex loci approach.204 As explained earlier in this Note, the Restatement
(First) expressly provided for ddpegage in tort disputes where the injury-causing
conduct and the injury occurred in separate states and where the state of the injury-
causing conduct provided a standard of care to govern the particular facts of the
case. 205 Further, d6pegage occurs even where the forum applies its own procedural law
while applying the substantive law of another jurisdiction-a routine occurrence in
choice-of-law cases.2°6 Ddpegage is not a technique of modem doctrine, but an
unremarkable and natural by-product of the choice-of-law process.
The Simon opinion correctly pointed out that a court engaging in issue-by-issue
choice-of-law analysis might, through failure to consider complementary laws
necessary to a proper understanding of state policy, construct a hybrid law that
frustrates the policy goals of the relevant jurisdictions without advancing any state's
policy interests. 20 7 Despite the validity of this criticism, proper governmental interest
analysis should avoid this result, since this approach aims to apply a law only where it
will advance the policy goals of an interested jurisdiction.2 8 This criticism merely
demonstrates that any choice-of-law technique can be applied incorrectly; this criticism
is equally true of any choice-of-law approach, and therefore should not serve as a basis
for rejecting any particular approach.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See supra text accompanying note 60.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 104-07.
205. See id.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 172-73.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
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2. Simon's Misapplication of the "Conduct-Regulating Exception"
The Simon court fundamentally misapplied the so-called conduct-regulating
exception in order to determine that Indiana substantive law should apply to all
substantive issues in the case. First, the near-absolute preference in modem doctrine for
application of the law of the place of the tortious conduct-what the court refers to as
the "conduct-regulating exception"--applies only where the choice-of-law issue
concerns a law dealing with conduct regulation. 209 Proper application of this exception
in Simon would have resulted in application of Indiana substantive law to the issue of
whether the FAA air traffic controllers were negligent, because Indiana has a strong
interest in determining the standard of care for conduct that occurs within its borders.
However, the conflict between Indiana and Pennsylvania law in this case concerned not
a matter of conduct regulation, such as the applicable standard of care, but matters of
loss allocation;210 therefore, the conduct-regulating exception is inapplicable.
Further, even if the conduct-regulating exception were applicable to some issue in
this case, it would dictate only that rules of conduct regulation-such as the applicable
standard of care for the Indiana-based air traffic controllers-would be determined by
Indiana law.211 Proper application of this exception dictates that loss-allocation issues
should still be determined by the law of the parties' residence, or the locus of their
relationship, rather than the place of the tortious conduct.21 2 This is because the
conduct-regulating exception is based on governmental interest analysis and the
assumption that the law of the place of the tortious conduct will have a predominant
interest in regulating conduct within its borders.2t a In rejecting both governmental
interest analysis and drpegage, the Simon court misapplied the conduct-regulating
exception to determine that Indiana law would govern not just issues of conduct
regulation, but all substantive legal issues in the case.
The rejection of governmental interest analysis ensured more than just the
misapplication of the conduct-regulating exception in Simon. It ensured that, in the
future, lower Indiana courts would be deprived of a powerful tool to evaluate the
importance of state contacts relative to the particular issues in a choice-of-law dispute.
The following section illustrates this problem.
3. Simon's Rejection of Governmental Interest Analysis Reduces Clarity
The Simon court concluded that the place of the allegedly negligent conduct was the
most important geographical contact and accordingly determined that Indiana law
would govern the dispute under the Hubbard test. However, after rejecting
governmental interest analysis as a tool for determining which contacts are most
209. See supra text accompanying notes 108-10.
210. "[R]ules imposing ceilings on the amount of damages or excluding certain types of
damages, such as for pain and suffering" are generally considered loss-distributive, as are "rules
dealing with contribution or indemnification among joint tortfeasors." See SCoLES ET AL., supra
note 21, at 794 n.6.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 108-10.
212. See id.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 101-03.
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important to the issues being litigated, the court offered no viable alternative
methodology for explaining why a particular contact is or is not significant.
The court's contention that the gravamen of this case was the allegedly negligent
conduct of the defendant offers little help in explaining the court's basis for selecting
the location of the allegedly negligent conduct as the most significant contact in Simon.
Indeed, it would seem odd ifthe court were characterizing the location of the negligent
conduct as central to the conflict in substantive laws; the conflict between Indiana and
Pennsylvania substantive law pertained not to whether the defendant behaved
negligently-an issue of conduct regulation-but to issues of loss allocation.
214
Therefore, the central conflict in substantive rules of law had nothing to do with the
determination of whether the defendant behaved negligently.
Alternatively, perhaps the court was arguing that the place of the negligent conduct
was the most significant contact because the defendant's liability depended on a
finding of negligence. However, it is difficult to understand how this reasoning would
help to resolve the choice-of-law inquiry. While a finding of negligence would be
necessary to hold the defendant liable, this is true of any negligence case. It was
equally true in Gollnick, where the court concluded that the parties' domicile, not the
location of the allegedly negligent conduct, was the most significant contact for
purposes of resolving the conflict of laws.215 Why was the location of the negligent
conduct controlling in Simon, but secondary in Gollnick? While the court offered the
conclusory assertion that the state of the parties' residence is more important in cases
involving family law or asset distribution, 21 6 it offered no reason for why this is true.
The court's statements that "an individual's actions and the recovery available to
others as a result of those actions should be governed by the law of the state in which
he acts" 217 and that "[p]eople do not take the laws of their home state with them when
they travel but are subject to the laws of the state in which they act '218 also offer little
help in evaluating the significance of state contacts and distinguishing Gollnick. If
these propositions were always controlling, then Gollnick would have been decided
differently; because Indiana was the location of the negligent conduct and parties do
not "take the laws of their home state with them" when they travel, Indiana's
intrafamily immunity law would have applied. However, the court concluded in
Gollnick that the location of the parties' common domicile, California, trumped the
location of the negligent conduct.
219
Again, after the rejection of governmental interest analysis as a valid choice-of-law
technique in Simon, the question remains: why was the parties' residence the most
significant contact in a case involving a conflict of intrafamily immunity rules, while
the location of the negligent conduct was the most significant contact in Simon, which
also involved a conflict of loss-allocating rules? It is not sufficient to answer this
question by simply identifying the place of the parties' residence as the most important
contact where the choice-of-law question concerns an intrafamily immunity rule; such
214. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 147-51.
216. See Simon v. United States, 805 N.E.2d 798, 807 (Ind. 2004).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 147-51.
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an answer begs the ultimate question, which is how the court reached the conclusion
that one contact was more important than another.
Given its rejection of governmental interest analysis as a technique for answering
choice-of-law questions, it is difficult to imagine the Simon court explaining Gollnick
by embracing the following proposition: California had the superior interest in the
application of its law because the rule involved was one of intrafamily immunity and
California was the state of the parties' common domicile. Yet this was precisely the
explanation offered by the First District Court of Appeals in Gollnick before the
Indiana Supreme Court adopted that opinion as its own.2 20 Modern doctrine,
incorporating governmental interest analysis, could sensibly explain Gollnick in this
fashion, and it could also sensibly predict that Indiana would resolve future conflicts
involving loss-allocation issues in this manner, assigning primary importance to the
state of the parties' domicile. Yet after Simon and the court's puzzling misapplication
of the "conduct-regulating exception," it is unclear what methodology lower courts
should use to evaluate the importance of state contacts relative to the issues being
litigated. It is equally unclear why the Indiana Supreme Court has identified the parties'
residence or place of business as the most significant contact in cases involving family
law or asset distribution.
4. Simon as the Dreaded "Anomalous Result"
Lack of analytical clarity and misapplication of the "conduct-regulating exception"
were not the only shortcomings of the Simon decision; the Simon result, analyzed using
governmental interest analysis, represents exactly the sort of anomalous result-
application of the law of a place with no interest in the application of its law in a
manner that frustrates the policy goals of an interested jurisdiction-that led courts to
abandon the rigid lex loci approach in favor of modern approaches that would produce
more rational results.221 As explained above, Pennsylvania and Indiana substantive law
differed only with regard to issues of loss allocation. 222 No Indiana parties were
involved in the case-the U.S. government was the sole defendant and neither plaintiff
was from Indiana.223 This left Indiana with no interest in applying its rules of loss
distribution in this case. Conversely, since one plaintiffwas from Pennsylvania, 224 that
state's loss-distribution policy interests were at least arguably implicated by the facts of
the case. This demonstrates that, lacking a coherent rationale for distinguishing the
importance of state contacts, the Hubbard approach is capable of generating the same
sort of anomalous results that plagued the classical approach and led to its demise in
most American jurisdictions, including Indiana.
CONCLUSION
In Simon, the Indiana Supreme Court missed an opportunity to clarify its choice-of-
law doctrine. In rejecting governmental interest analysis and ddpegage while
220. See id.
221. See supra text accompanying note 30.
222. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
223. See Simon, 805 N.E.2d at 800-01.
224. Id.
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simultaneously embracing, but misapplying, the "conduct-regulating exception" of
modem doctrine, the court created additional confusion concerning its methodology for
determining the significance of state contacts. The Simon court's apparent approval of
the Gollnick principle-that the parties' residence or place of business should be
considered the most significant contact in choice-of-law questions involving
intrafamily immunity provisions--only complicates matters, because this principle is
consistent with the loss-allocating/conduct-regulating distinction in modem doctrine
and is rooted in governmental interest analysis, a methodology that the Simon court
emphatically rejected.
Because of the absence of an underlying methodology, such as governmental
interest analysis, for determining why certain state contacts are important and others
are not, the Hubbard test is severely flawed. While the Indiana Supreme Court
abandoned the lex loci approach because of the anomalous results that it sometimes
produced, the court failed to embrace popular modem approaches-such as the
Restatement (Second) or the governmental interest analysis incorporated in that
approach--due to their supposed unpredictability and lack of guidance. However, the
Hubbard test, lacking a coherent analytical framework for evaluating the significance
of state contacts, does little to improve upon-and arguably exacerbates-the
supposed unpredictability of modem approaches. Further, as illustrated by the Simon
decision, the Hubbard test is capable of producing the same sort of anomalous results
that led many jurisdictions, including Indiana, to abandon traditional choice-of-law
doctrine.
It is not sufficient to direct, as Simon did, that courts "simply look at the contacts
that exist between the action and the relevant states and determine which state has the
most significant relationship with the action." 225 Such a directive overlooks the basic
function of any choice-of-law approach-to provide courts with a method for
evaluating state contacts and selecting the state with the most significant contacts to a
dispute. Until the Indiana Supreme Court offers a coherent analytical framework for
evaluating the relative importance of state contacts, the Hubbard test will likely
continue to exhibit the vices-anomalous results and lack of guidance or
predictability-but not the virtues, of both traditional and modem choice-of-law
doctrine.
225. Simon, 805 N.E.2d at 803.
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